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CASE NO. 10278
IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
J\HCHAEL MONTGOMERY,
MARIE MONTGOMERY,
LINDA MONTGOMERY,
hy their guardian ad litem
MARIE DA VIS, and
BERNICE WOOD PODROZA,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
- vs. PREFERRED RISK MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMP ANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves the questions :
1. As to whether or not an insured cooperated with

an auto liability insurer, the appellant.
2. Whether or not appellant was substantially prejudiced by insured's non-appearance at the trial.
3. Whether appellant made any attempt to obviate
prejudicial effect of the non-attendance of the insured.
-!. Whether or not the appellant used due diligence
to obtain the cooperation of the insured.

5. Whether or not appcllant waived any lack of cooperation by the insured.
DISPOSITION IN

LOWI~R

COURT

The case here on appeal is the result of a pr(·viou'
case in the same district wherein the plaintiffs in l111·
instant case obtained a judgment against the driver of
an automobile which at the time of tlw accid('nt \1as
insured by the appellant. Thrn•after tlw plaintiff:(respondents) brought direct action on their judgment
against the insurer resulting in a judgnwnt against th"
insurer (appellant).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court's jndgment. Respondents urge confirmation of the trial co mt':;
decree.
STATEi\lENT OF FACTS
Darrell \Vood borrowed the car of his father, who
had a policy with the Appellant, to take Lois ).Jontgo1uery, tlw mother of the minor Montgomery plai11tiffr.
Bernice \Voods Podroza, and Lawrence 1krrick for a
drive. With Darrell \Yood at the wheel, the car left tlw
hig}nrny resulting in fatal injuries to Lois Montgo1uery
and injuries to Bernice \Voods Podraza.
The minor children and Bernice \Voods Poclrmm filccl
an action in Davis County, Ftah, against Danell Wood
for their loss, which case was given file No. G9::lfi. Summons and Complaint were served upon Darrell Wood on
February 28, 1958, but not deliven•cl to Appellant until
April 12, 1958, (T. 77 L. 23 and I~xhibit 9).
2

The following dates are significant in this case:
June :2G, 1957

Car ldt highway, resulting in death
of Lois Montgomery and injuries to
Bernice \Voods Podroza

October 15, 1957

Darrell \Vood and passenger Lawrence l\Ierrick gave statement to
Appellant's representative before
court reporter, Cecil Tucker, concr•rning the circumstances of the
day of June 26, 1957.

November 13, 1958

August 1, 1961

Deposition of Darrell Wood taken
before Court Reporter, Cecil Tucker, in case No. 6936.
Completed deposition of Darrell
Wood mailed to address of named
insured Willard Wood
First effort by Appellant after December 18, 1958, to follow-up getting the deposition signed.
First letter to Darrell Wood requesting his signature on the deposition after it was mailed to his
father, December 18, 1958.
Pre-trial of Case No. 6936

September 12, 19Gl

Trial day of Case No. 6936.

December 18, 1958
November, 19GO
March 20, 1961

Darrell Wood, on October 15, 1957, gave a statement
to appellant's representative before Cecil Tucker, Court
Ileportc•r (Exhibit 15). In this statement Darrell Wood
stated that he was a carpenter, was then unemployed and
had !wen since February, 1957, except for two weeks'
work (page 2); that he was a married man, (page 1);
that thPy bought a six pack of beer, (page 9) and bought
3

one other drink (page 12); that he and Lawrence Menick
planned to tell and did tell the investigating officm
that Lawrence Merrick was the driver at the tinw of th1'
accident (pages 21 and 22); that he was sentPnccd tn
six months in jail (page 22); serwd sixty-four day.1
(page 23); that he had his driver's license revoked on
a drunken driving charge about two years before (pnges
24 and 25).
The difficulty of finding Darrell Wood for deposition is described at T. 70-71. On November 13, 195S,
Darrell Wood appeared for deposition with Appellant's
counsel. The deposition followed generally the statement
previously given except that in the deposition Darrr,11
Wood said that no beer was purchased (page 11) which
differed from the purchase of beer indicated in the statement (page 9). The deposition also establisli(!d that he
was in Michigan from March until June in 195G, the year
before the accident.
The completed deposition of Darrell Wood was
mailed to ·willard Wood, father of Darrell Wood, Decewber 18, 1958, requesting that he deliver it to Danell.
There is no evidence that the deposition was ever delivered to Darrell Wood.
There was no follow-up effort made by the Appellant to get the deposition signed between DecembN, 195S,
and November, 1960, (T. GO - G2). No effort was rnaJe
to contact Darrell vVood through the Carpenter's l'nion
or through his wife or children in Cadillac, ..\Iichigan (T.
65), and no personal contact effort was made to con tad
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Darrell Wood at his last known address in Roy, Utah,
(T. 53 and 65), nor to find him through his brothers and
sisters who reside in Utah, nor through his friend Lawrence l\Ierrick (T. 5G, 57, 65, and 66). That illustrative
of the Appellant's efforts to find Darrell Wood is contained in the statement of his father (T. 55, L. 14-20).
That the only time he talked with representatives of the
Appellant was when he went to see them himself. That
none of the letters written by Appellant to Darrell Wood
stated or directed him to keep Appellant notified as to
his whereabouts nor stressed the importance of his keeping in touch with them. (T. 84 and 85). That the first
letter written Darrell ·wood after deposition was mailed
to father on DecembPr 28, 1958, was dated l\larch 20,
1961, (Exhibit #5).
At the pre-trial on August 1, 1961, counsel for Appellant informed the Court that the defendant's insurance
eompany might invoke the non-cooperation provisions
of the policy and that he might withdraw as counsel for
~aid defense; and the ·Court gave counsel until August
25, 19Gl, in which to advise defendant of the withdrawal;
counsel for Appellant also offered the sum of $1,000.00
in full settlement of all the causes of action (Exhibit
11). At the trial on September 12, 1961, before proceeding with evidence, eounsel for Appellant after stating his position made an offer to pay the sum of $1.000.00
in fnll settlement of all causes of action then pending;
and in r!'sponse to questioning from the Court, stated
that he won Id proeeed with tlw defense of Darrell Wood
nndPr the eirenrnstanees as stated (Exhibit 1~).
5

At the trial of Case No. G93G, Cecil Tucker served
as the Court Reporter, but Appellant made> no effort tr1
have him, prior to or at the trial, certify thl unsigm·d
deposition of Darrell vVood and made no effort to introduce such deposition, ( T. 83), as provided !Jy Rule 311
(t>), U.R.C.P.
1

The judgment obtained in ·Case No. G93G ag-aiirnt
Darrell vVood remained unsatisfied and th<> ahow-rntitled action was brought against the Appellant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
EVIDENCE SUPPOR'l1 ED 'L'HE DI8TRlC1'
COURT'S FINDING THAT THE INSURED
COOPERATED \VlrrH rrIIl~ APPELL"'\.X1'.
After the accident (June 2G, 1%7), the driVl'l' Darn·ll
\Vood appeared on October 15, 1937, and gan• a stall·rnent before Cecil Tucker, the Court Reporter (Exhibit
13) ; later delivered to the appellants the Summons and
Complaint served upon him, and appeared on Novl'mlwr
13, 1958, at the office of Glenn \V. Adams to haVl' l1is
deposition taken. The deposition was mailed to \Yilhud
\Vood, father of Darrell \Vood, with a request that Darrell's signature be obtained on it. '11 here is no <'VillPn.::~
that Darrell Wood ever receiv<>d the deposition. 'l'lwn·
is no c vidence that Darrell \Vood ever received any notice of the trial elate.
1

In Panczko vs. EaglP Indemnity Company of New
York, 104 NE 2d, G45, tlw insun-'d apIJ<-•ared and gm-e a
6

pre-trial deposition and was advised he would be notified
1r!wn th0 case was called for trial. Letters were written
(ti the driver telling him about the trial day, which letters
wPrr' rec:eipted by his wife; but he had separated from
ltis wife and there was no evidence that he received
noticr or knew of the trial day. A jury conclusion, on
interrogatories that he did not fail to cooperate, was
affirmed.
ln two cases, involving similar fact situations, it
1'.as <letenuined that there was no lack of cooperation
nil the part of the insmed l'ven though the insured did
nnt appear at the trial wlwn requested by the insurer.
Wormington vs. Associated Indemnity Corporation, 56
l'.~<l, l'.25-t (Wyoming) and ,Jpnsm vs. Eureka Casualty
Company, G~ P.'.2d 5.f-0 (California).
'rhP cas<~ of Cameron vs. Berger, 7A2d 293, cited by

A)l]Jdlant (Br. 8), appears to be concerned with a totally
different fact situation. An examination of that case
discloses that the insured, to avoid arrest, disappeared
from hPr home several months prior to suit being filed
agairn;t her for damages, and she gave the insurer no
aid whatsoe\·er in the preparation or trial of the suits
against her; and the insurer had no notice of the suits
until eoun:wl for plaintiff notifo•d them on October 11,
that tlw trial of the actions was listed for November 15.
Tn the <·asp at hand, Darrell Wood did cooperate
with the insmer, tlw Appellant, by giving them a sworn
~tatement concerning the accident prior to any action
hPing filed ag·ainst him, <lPlivt>red suit papers to the
,..,
I

insurer after they were served on him, and at their request also appeared for a deposition long after the adion
had been filed.

POINT II
EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE CONCLUSION THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO
SHUW IT WAS SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICED BY THE NON-APPEARANCE OF
DARRELL WOOD.
29A Am. Jur. Sec. 1479, P. 588 states" ... it appears
to be the view of the great majority of the courts that
the lack of cooperation by the insured in failing to attend
the trial or testify must be substantial or material, an<l
that a technical or inconsequential lack of cooperation i:.;
insufficient to void the policy .. accordingly, it has frequently been held that the clause is not breeched by the
insured's non-attendance where his testimony would nut
have been of material aid or ·where, for this or other
reason, the insurer was not prejudiced by his absence,
or where the same or equivalent testimony could have
been or was presented in some other manner or from
some other source."

It may have been much more advantageous for the
Appellant to have utilized the deposition of Darrell Wood
to bring before the Court his version of the facts concerning the accident without further cross-examination
than to personally have him present at the trial to again
8

testify to such facts and then be vigorously cross-examined concerning his testimony.
The memorandum decision of the trial court suggests that the appearance of Darrell Wood, in view of
his background, may not have been helpful to the appellants. This was the observation of the court in the State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company vs. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 387 P.2d 82!1.
POINT III
THE E\TIDEKCE Sl~PPORTED THE DISTRICT COFR'l"S CONCLrSION THAT THE
INSURER DID ~OT USE DILIGENCE TO
SECURE THE COOPERATION OF THE INSURED.
The courts have generally recognized that the insurer must establish due diligence to secure the insured'::;
cooperation, particularly where the insurer has reason
to anticipate that its insured might not respond ( 60
A.L.H. ~d 1Hi3 - 11'71). A case which is illustrative of
this principal is as follows: State Farm Mutual Auton1obile Insurance Company vs. Farmers Insurance Exd1ange, 387 P.2d, 825 (Oregon), wherein the Court
pointed out at page 828 that it is to the interest of the
defendant's insurance company not to have the insured
coperate as this gives them an opportunity to escape a
judgment which has been entered against the insured;
and that therefore their efforts to locate the insured
should bl' critically examined. The court further stated
9

that the opportunity inherent in this situation is a factor
to be considered in determining the scope of their duty
to use due diligence. Also see Johnson vs. Doughty, 38:J
P.2d, 760 (Oregon).
Applying the reasoning set forth in these cases, it
seems clear that Appellant did not use due diligence in
attempting to secure the attendance of Darrell Wood at
the trial where they had prior indications that he might
not be readily available at trial. The completed depo:;ition was mailed to Darrell 'Vood's father December,
1958, with a request to obtain Darrell's signature on it.
There was no follow-up effort between December, 1958,
and November, 1960, and the first letter tracing the deposition was not mailed until .March 20, 19Gl. Darrell
·wood apparently disappeared about June, 1959 (T. G3
L. 23); he was available for two years after the accident
and for six months after the deposition was mailed. It
is noted that the Appellant obtained the statement of
passenger Lawrence .hforrick (Exhibit 14) on July 2G,
1957, one month after the accident but failed to haye one
of their claims representatives personally take the deposition to Darrell Wood or do any other thing to get hi::
signature during the si..-x months that he was apparrn0.1·
available after December, 1958. In view of the information obtained by the Appellant in the statement givrn
by him October 15, 1957, that he was separated from his
wife, had been in Michigan three months the year before
and was unemployed, put Appellant on notice that Darrell Wood might be difficult to find at trial time and that
an early signing of the deposition was imperative
10

POINT IV
THE APPELLANT WAIVED ANY LACK
OF COOPEHATIOX OX THE PART OF THE
IXf'l~RED BY COXTIXCING ITS DEFENSE.
At tltt· trial on SPptPmlJer 12, 1961, counsel for ApJiellant although advising the Court that he appeared
in ddensP of the> rnatt0r on hehalf of the insurance company only, and aft<•r offrring to :-:ettle all th(• rau~es of
action for tht· sum of $1,000.00, in responsP to tlw Court
.<tating that thr> only defPndant was Darrell 'Vood, counqJ for Ap1wllant stated that hP would procf'ed with the
uef'ense of Darrell 'Vood under the circumstances stated.
"\t tlir prr-trial on Angust 1, 1961, Appellant's counsel
had been i1rntructed by the Court to notify Darrell 1rVood
by Augnst 25, 1961 if he did in fact intend to withdraw;
counsel for appellant also offered to settle all causes of
nl'tion for $1,000.00; no withdrawal was ewr made pur~nant to tlw lH"P-trial order.

iOALH '.2<1 1 '.203 statPs, ''It ap1wars to be the rule
that an antornobil0 liability insnrt-r whieh learns before
tl1r trial of an aetion against its in:-:un•d that the insurf'd
has hn·aelw<l the co-01wration elanse of the policy, and
nt•\'Prthel!•ss def Pnds him at tlw trial, thereby waives or
is (•stopped to assert the imrnn•d's nonrooperation, in a
~nbseqnPnt action to rProver on the policy."
70ALR 2d 1205 statPs, "In a number of cases

111

whi<:h thl' im:nred nndPr an automobile liability insurant·P policy faill'<l to appear at thl' trial of tlw original
aetion brought against him, and tl1t' insurPr conduct<'d
11

the insured's defense in his absence, it was held that
the insurer thereby waived or was estopped to assert
this lack of cooperation by the insured, in a subsequPnt
action on the policy."
60ALR 2nd 1156 states, "Most of the courts considering the question have held or stated that an insurer,
by continuing the defense with knowledge of the conduct
of the insured, may waive the breach of the condition of
the policy requiring his attendance or testimony at the
trial, or may be estopped to take advantage of the hread1
when sued by the injured party on the policy."
Brandon vs. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 29.J:
P. 881 (Kansas), appears to be a representative case
under these ALR citations. In this case, an action was
brought by B. against "'\V. for personal injuries, the attorney for W. was also the attorney for the insurance
company of "'\V. in resistence of the claim. Bdore tlie
trial of the case resulted, ,V. became insolvent and disappeared. Thereafter he took no part in the trial and
his whereabouts were unknown to any of the parties.
His attorney who acted for the insurer procured a number of continuances of the case and when it was finally
tried, a judgment in favor of B. was rendered. Several
offers of setlement were made to B. by the attorney for
"'\V. and the insurer in settlement of the claim and judg
ment. The court held that by the attorney for W. and
the insurer proceeding in the defense after W. has disappeared, and also applying for and obtaining a number of continuances of the case, and also having made a
number of offers of compromise and settlement with the
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plaintiff, operated as a waiver of the failure of W. to
aid in the defense.

POINT V
APPELLAXT MCST SHOW THAT IT
ACTED "WITH REASOXABLE DILIGENCE
AKD TOOK REASOXABLE STEPS TO OB\'1A11E THE PRE.Jl'DICIAL EFFECT OF
~ON-A1 TEN"DAN"CE OF IN"Sl'RED.
1

Rule 30(e), U.R.C.P. provided for the use of an
unsig11ed deposition. The trial court in its Memorandum
Decision expressed the view that if the testimony of
Darrell Wood as given in his deposition were believed,
it would be a complete defense to the guest claims of
plaintiffs.
The Appellant took a statement (Exhibit 14) from
Lawrence Merrick, one of passengers in the car, and
k]J(•\1' his addrr•ss and the name and phone number of
l1is sister (.:\I<>rrick's statenwnt page 24). This statement
1rns giwn .J nly :2G, 1957, at Spring Glen, Utah, covering
the evc•nts of June 2G, 1957. While Merrick stated that
h1' \1 as asleep right at the time the car left the road
(pages 14 · 1j), he did not state that the car travelled
about -iO miles per hour corning back (page 13-14). There
is no evidence of any effort to secure the attendance of
Lawrence Merrick at the trial for what assistance he
ruight have been to the defense.
failure to offer the unsigned deposition
uf Danpll Wood as provided by tlw Rule, or to make an
effort to procure the attendance of witness Lawrence
:\.ppellant'~

13

Merrick, was a lack of reasonable diligence to obviate the
prejudicial effect of the insureds non-attendance (see
29A Am. Jur. Sec. 1479).
CONCLUSION
The findings and decree of Trial Court were found-

ed on fact and law presented at the trial and should be

affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
MAXD. LAMPH
305-308 Kiesel Building
Ogden, Utah
GLENN W. ADAMS
512 Eccles Building
Ogden, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Respondents
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